'A History of Modern Britain' by Andrew Marr

This will probably be the thickest book I read this year.

Similar to my experience reading 'Cameron at 10' last year, learning about modern British history made me feel like I was at that bit of an SFF novel where a character learns about the background of their world and how the current crises have come about. Britain's confused relationships with America and continental Europe are a major thread throughout our post-WW2 history.

Major catastrophes such as the Second World War cause major changes: class barriers had been broken down as people from all backgrounds came to together to either fight and die as soldiers, or worked together on the home front. The different classes began to understand their differences were mainly material, and there was greater awareness of poverty and a desire to do something about it. Government wartime control of health, transport, food (the diets of a lot of poor people actually improved during the war years - the meager rations they received were more food than they could have afforded before the war), and other industries, combined with the wartime ideals of Britons all working together to help each other out and fight a common enemy, was like a trial run for socialism.

And so, after the war, there was landslide victory for Attlee's Labour party, who had campaigned along the lines of (I'm paraphrasing), "Let's use state planning, which helped us win the fight against fascism, to win the fight against poverty and illness."

The Attlee government created the NHS and massively expanded the welfare state, causing a huge increase in living standards across the country. It is a shame such a government would probably not have been elected if it weren't for the horrors of World War 2. 

(The First World War had a similar effect: in its immediate aftermath, the government extended suffrage and embarked on a huge social housing policy, to make the country "fit for heroes who had won the war" - without these policies, many of the soldiers would have returned from the war to live in slums and been unable to vote for their government.)

Reading about how the Attlee government was made possible by WW2, I now understand (and further abhor) the 'Lexit' argument that did the rounds a bit back in 2016: the Left should vote for Brexit because it will be a disaster that would force the country to come together in crisis, and make a leftwing government more likely as a result. Even among those ostensibly on the right, those that think No-Deal Brexit would be a disaster in the short term seem to think the cost is worth it if in the longer term the country is brought together through hardship. How often is the Blitz and WW2 mentioned in discussions of Brexit? We survived the Blitz, we can survive Brexit! Brexit will be tough, but it'll bring some wartime spirit to the country and bring us together!

Are the people craving Brexit and the (idealised) wartime spirit really craving a socialist government, without realizing it or wanting to realize it?

Britain was triumphant in WW2, but it was ruined economically and literally. Post-war governments were not honest with the electorate about how weak the country was after war: they had a "don't talk about it in front of the children/voters" approach. They didn't want to ruin the triumphant, positive mood winning the war had instilled in the populace. The crumbling British Empire was no longer a superpower, and was dependent on American aid for years after the war. To keep the aid coming, Britain became the more subservient partner in the "special relationship".

Having defeated an extremely racist ideology in World War 2, with a lot of help from colonial soldiers, the British government thought of Britain as the opposite of the Nazis, i.e. not racist (obviously, there was a lot of racism in Britain). British citizenship was extended across the colonies: colonial subjects were now British citizens who could move to Britain if they so wished, and would be welcomed with open arms. There was also plenty of work that needed doing to rebuild the country. This was essentially freedom of movement across the commonwealth; however, transport was expensive so not as many people could afford as would do today. Nevertheless, a lot of people did come.

One of the first ships of immigrants to arrive was the HMT Empire Windrush, from which the Windrush Generation gets its name. Symbolically, the ship was a re-purposed Germany Navy Troopship captured during the war. Knowing this, reflect on the recent Windrush scandal and what it says about the current state of our nation.

The Suez Crisis of 1956 is often seen as the time when Britain proved to the world that it was no longer a superpower. The Egyptian president nationalized the Suez Canal, which had been under Anglo-French control. The British and the French wanted to invade to retake the canal, but America and the USSR had other ideas. Both knew that if the British and French were kept out of Egypt, all of the old colonial powers would be out of the Middle East, leaving it open for them to influence. It was the only time during the Cold War that America sided with the USSR against its supposed allies. International pressure and domestic anti-war protest led to the invasion force being withdrawn before they had recaptured the canal. Britain and France humiliated on the world stage.

The French government learnt from this that America could not be trusted: they would betray their allies in a heartbeat if it benefited them. France turned away from the US to focus on its continental allies, to build what would become the EU. Britain was unsure what to do: it was stung by the betrayal, but had been dependent on America since WW2 and wanted to maintain the "special relationship". British governments since WW2 have been divided over whether Britain should be closer to America, or closer to Europe, and this constant division has meant that Britain has never been as close as it could have been with either.

When Britain was first trying to join the EEC (which became the EU), it was blocked twice, with the French president De Gaulle being the most vocal opponent of Britain joining. The European nations were worried that Britain was too close to America, the Betrayer, and would be a Trojan horse for American interests in Europe. They were also deeply concerned about Britain dragging the Commonwealth into Europe with it, especially with the 'freedom of movement' mentioned above (tighter immigration controls were later introduced). Continental Europe was more racist than Britain, and didn't want all those non-white, non-European people from Britain's colonies getting to the mainland.

Britain joined the EEC in the 70s, under the Conservative government of Edward Heath. The next Labour government held a referendum on whether the populace actually wanted to be in it (the referendum had been Tony Benn's idea: he wanted Britain out).

The campaigns on both sides focused on how food pricing was affected by membership: both sides claimed their option would result in cheaper food. Prior to joining, Britain had imported most of its food from the Commonwealth, now it was getting it from the continent. The Yes campaigners said European food was cheaper; the No, that Commonwealth food would be cheaper. Neither campaign really talked about the ways the EEC was planning to develop and grow over the decades, becoming increasingly a federal Europe. Neither side seemed to think that was important. Both Labour and Conservatives were divided over EEC membership: neither was a 100% Yes or No party.

(I spoke to a man from New Zealand the other week, who said that a lot of people in New Zealand and Australia had been disappointed when Britain went closer to Europe and away from the Commonwealth. Their trade with Britain decreased, and they had to find new markets to sell their food.)

Many Brexit supporters have said they would have voted No in 1975 had the campaigns mentioned the plans of a closer union; many felt betrayed and lied to, when the EEC became more than a trading arrangement: when it became the EU.

Britain's early years in the EEC coincided with a bunch of other major changes to the country, which in some minds were causally linked to EEC membership. Decimalization of currency meant coins such as shillings and farthings, which went back to Anglo-Saxon times, were replaced by the more rational system of pounds and pence we have today - Britain's history and tradition was being eroded, thought some, leaving them with a sense of alienation. Industries declined and industrial strife increased. The government went to the IMF for a loan to help its finances. The oil crisis of '73 and '79 caused huge disruptions, especially when combined with the more frequent strikes... leading to the Winter of Discontent, and the election of Margaret Thatcher.

Thatcher's reforms were... divisive, to say the least.

Paradoxically, she privatized a lot of public services, while also increasing central government control of others and removed powers from local authorities. Prior to the Thatcher years, local elections had been about the local candidates and how they would use local powers to improve local areas. As local powers were taken away by central government, local elections increasingly became a proxy vote on the government in power.

She crushed the unions and allowed industries to die. The state would interfere less in business: the Market would reign. Mass unemployment arrived in modern Britain for the first time: this shifted power away from workers towards employers. When employment is high, workers are in demand and have greater power to push for better pay: when there's always a significant number of people unemployed but wanting a job... well, we can just hire one of the other people if you don't want low pay.

Mass debt also arrived. Right to Buy meant council tenants could buy their homes at a massively reduced price. The deregulated financial sector was happy to lend mortgage money. Britain's obsession with house prices and house buying was born. At the time Thatcher came to power, a greater proportion of Brits lived in social housing than in many communist countries. Now it's less than 20% and there are endless headlines about the housing crisis. The government doesn't build much social housing, and the private sector is incentivised to build and sell slowly to keep prices high.

While Thatcher had been pro-Europe to start with, she increasingly became anti-Europe during her time in office, as the federal project accelerated. The big disagreement came over the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) - the different European currencies would work towards maintaining agreed exchange rates with the German Deutcshmark through monetary policy: this would make the planned transition to a single currency easier. Thatcher hated this idea, but the Treasury and much of her party was broadly in favour, which combined with the Poll Tax fiasco brought about her downfall.

Thus, the Conservative party divide between what would become Leavers and Remainers grew, and soon it would grow again.

In 1992, Germany was going through an economic boom after reunification. Britain, not so booming, was struggling to keep the pound up to the value of the Deutschmark. The German government didn't want to ruin the boom because it needed money to help former East Germany. John Major's government kept pushing up interest rates until homeowners and businesses were in danger of defaulting. Major wanted to ride out the storm, keep Britain in the ERM, so the country could be at the heart of the developing union.

But it was not to be. The government cracked, and Britain exited the ERM on Black Wednesday.- 16th September 1992. Economic recovery followed, and the Conservative Eurosceptics became more confident. In its aftermath, the Referendum Party was founded, which had a single policy: hold a referendum of Britain's membership of the EU.

Tony Blair's New Labour easily beat the humiliated Conservatives, winning the largest majority in Labour's history. But there were problems. Labour had been out of power for two decades: the new ministers had no experience of government and made a lot of mistakes. Blair took to courting all the newspapers, telling them what they wanted to hear, which inevitably turned them against him when the lie was revealed. Blair wanted to bring Britain closer to Europe, have Britain join the Euro, but struggled to balance his European aspirations with his courting of the anti-EU press. Lies, half-truths, and twisted truths became increasingly common from politicians: outright lying to the press and the electorate was being normalized among the political class. Blair got the nickname Bliar.

Oof, this is a long post isn't it? This book ends in 2007, with Blair's resignation and some descriptions of recent changes to Britain, which we're so accustomed to now it felt that they were once new. Increasing surveillance through CCTV. Increasing concerns about data protection - who buys our personal data, and is this important? Increasing Internet usage - Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World Wide Web, warned in 2006 that it could be used to spread disinformation and undermine democracy. Immigration was increasingly becoming a major political issue: refugees from the Middle East were fleeing conflicts (which Britain was a part of) and settling in Britain, more people from Europe were coming over here. Islamophobia had become more common since 9/11 and 7/7. Politicians were often talking about the long term and economic benefits of immigration, while neglecting to mention the short term costs: the extra burden on public services, and worsening the housing crisis (to homeowners this was a good thing since it meant higher house prices). Since mass unemployment had arrived with Thatcher, the idea that 'immigrants are stealing our jobs' became more common and more convincing...

(A more recent paperback edition continues the story to 2017.)

Knowing the historical context for our current affairs is important, and as you can probably tell I learnt a lot from this book and enjoyed it.

Marr's writing flows well and he has come great turns of phrase. My main quibble is that he gets obsessed with the Westminster drama: with the characters and their relationships to each other, which often feels like fluff and filler. This is probably his training as a Westminster journalist at work. The news is what the politicians are doing and saying; the history is what the politicians did and said. I would have preferred more emphasis on how the country as a whole changed. When lands beyond Westminster are mentioned, it is usually because the people in Westminster have to respond to events there.

There's plenty of description of the drama around passing legislation, but comparatively little about how the legislation affected the country. This prevents him from being too critical of any politician's actual record and legacy. Criticisms are typically leveled at their character, and how they interacted with colleagues. There are segments on topics outside of Westminster, but they read like he would much rather get back to Westminster. It sometimes feels more like 'A History of Modern Westminster and its Occasional Relations with Other Lands, with Minor Digressions onto Other Topics'. This makes the book feel broad but shallow. That's fine, I guess: there's plenty of suggestions for further reading in the notes.

I did enjoy this book a lot, though I do feel a slight disappointment that it isn't the book I wanted it to be, but that book would never have written by Andrew Marr: he's a journalist, not a historian.

'Random Acts of Senseless Violence' by Jack Womack

On the one hand, this novel is a very impressive achievement, an extremely believable tale of a family descending into poverty as society collapses, told as 6 months of diary entries written by a 12-year old girl. The way the language shifts over the course of the novel is incredibly, masterfully done - from plain and simple English written by a girl doing well at school and living in a nice area, to paragraphs of street slang written by a girl struggling to get by as her life collapses.

On the other hand, this is an extremely believable tale of a family descending into poverty as society collapses. It's not a fun book; it's so bleak. I can appreciate it as a technical and imaginative achievement but I can't really say I enjoyed reading it, especially in the current political climate.

Bit too real.

'Cameron at 10' by Seldon and Snowdon

If you'd told me a few years ago that in the near future I would read a 600-page book about David Cameron's time as prime minister, partly out of nostalgia for the relatively-good pre-Brexit days, I would have... I don't know how I would have reacted.

I only started properly paying attention to politics for the 2015 election, and had learnt about the Coalition years primarily from leftwing sources explaining how terrible they were, so reading this book, which discusses the Cameron years mostly positively and almost fawningly praises many of the key players, was quite a refreshing reading experience. Indeed, completing it I feel like my political awareness has leveled up, and my opinion of the Conservative party has changed.

The book does a good job of humanizing the Tories, presenting them as people who do believe they are working for the betterment of the country. This should be an obvious point, but even though I've moved on from almost exclusively reading leftwing sources for British politics, my immersion in such material in 2015 had left me with an image of the Conservatives as actively malicious, possibly sociopathic, people who know the harm caused by their policies and revel in it, who are deliberately destroying the British state and impoverishing millions to further enrich the wealthy, causing as much damage as possible before swanning off to a cushy job on the other side of the revolving door. It's a compelling narrative, easy to get behind with our minds which enjoy tales and heroes and villains: the Conservatives do make convincing villains. (There is a Tumblr account called 'Tory MPs Looking Sinister; David Cameron's speech bemoaning our 'passively tolerant society' was quoted by Doctor Doom.)

I now see the Conservatives as horrendously out of touch ideologues with obscene amounts of self-confidence and no real understanding or experience of the lives of ordinary people. But, mostly, ultimately well-meaning.

(A recent example of horrendous out-of-touchness: MPs recently called for an inquiry into food bank usage in the UK, to determine whether the government policy of impoverishing people has led to increased food bank usage since 2010. Conservatives believe the increase is due to food banks being better advertised nowadays, so more people know about them. This is the view taken in this book.)

The 'Cameron at 10' hardback was published in October 2015, the story ending with the 2015 election victory. This paperback edition was rushed out after Cameron's resignation, with two superficial chapters added which briefly summarize the final year of his premiership.

Reading the book in the current political climate is an odd experience, especially since my knowledge of the the Coalition years was really quite limited. It felt like an extended flashback sequence, a world-building infodump, from a fantasy or SF novel, providing context and explanation for the world's current crises, the backstory to our country's dystopian present.

The amount of foreshadowing to our current problems is ridiculous. The chapters on Cameron's dealings with the EU are particularly bad: you couldn't get away with heavy-handed foreshadowing on this scale in fiction.

Before becoming Prime Minister, Cameron pulled Conservative MEPs from the European People's Party to form the European Conservatives and Reformists (these are parties within the European Parliament formed out of alliances between national parties from different countries). The EPP became the largest party in the Parliament - Cameron's decision to pull his MEPs out gave them less influence over EU policy.

EU leaders were frequently annoyed by the British negotiating strategy of demanding what they wanted, remaining inflexible, and storming off with a huff and veto if they didn't get what they wanted. Merkel had exasperated conversations with Cameron explaining that he should come with a flexible negotiating strategy if he wants to achieve something which 28 countries can agree to. #NoDealIsBetterThanABadDeal

When Jean-Claude Juncker was in the running for President of the European Commission, only Cameron and Hungary's proto-fascist Victor Orban voted against him. Juncker allegedly had far less support until Cameron made a major cock up: he had been courting EU leaders to vote against Juncker, but then he publicly stated that Britain would be more likely to vote Leave in the EU referendum if federalist Juncker won. On the continent this was reported as Cameron trying to blackmail EU leaders. No leader wants to give in to blackmail and appear weak, so Cameron's threat backfired and support solidified around Juncker, despite many people's reservations about him.

The Coalition years are defined by austerity. Coming into power, the government embarked on a program of cuts to public services designed to shrink the state and reduce the budget deficit. Emergency services, welfare, defence, local government, legal aid, and more was cut. Public sector workers had a pay cap which, when taking inflation into account, amounted to a real terms pay cut. NHS funding was frozen, meaning a real terms cut when considering the increase in demand. The cuts were accompanied by tax cuts, which were supposed to stimulate economic growth: corporations would have more money to invest in new jobs.

The majority of economists were opposed to the austerity program. Other EU leaders warned him against it: such a program would slow UK growth, and by extension slow EU growth. The Obama administration warned him against it: austerity would slow UK growth, and by extension slow global growth. But team Cameron as determined: they had their plan and would stick to it. They were inspired by Margaret Thatcher and Geoffrey Howe's determination to carry out their free market agenda despite a lot of opposition from economists and other groups at the time.

The economy grew, but not rapidly. The UK had one of the slowest recoveries of developed countries. What's more, the deficit wasn't going down fast enough: tax rises were needed. They chose some particularly regressive tax increases: increasing VAT from 17.5% to 20% (despite promising not to), and introducing the 'Pasty Tax' on hot foods (later revoked due to protests). During this period, living standards were declining, public services were worsening, and...

(a) EU budget contributions were increasing. Since austerity had been sold to the UK public as a necessary evil the country had to endure for economic recovery, the fact that contributions to the EU were increasing and other EU countries (with the exception of Greece) were not undergoing such harsh austerity, gave the impression that the EU was taking advantage of the British recovery effort, holding Britain down from a greater economic future. To many, voting Leave was a protest against austerity, which unfortunately had been erroneously linked to the EU in people's minds.

(b) Immigration increased to record highs, putting further strain on the already stretched public services. The government was happy to deflect blame for worsening public services onto immigrants, contributing to the normalization of anti-immigrant rhetoric, and, since the Conservatives had campaigned saying they would cut immigration to tens of thousands and instead oversaw immigration reaching record highs, gave the impression that the UK had no control over its borders. Ironically, the record immigration levels probably prevented the UK entering an austerity-induced recession: an increased population means more taxpayers and more spenders contributing to the economy.

(c) The Foreign Aid budget increased. Cameron had pledged to reach the G8 foreign aid spending target by the end of the Coalition parliament, and, after witnessing what happened when Clegg went back on very public promises, didn't want to risk looking like they'd abandoned their principles, especially on something that would be judged across the world, not just in the UK. Furthermore, Cameron hoped the 'soft power' of foreign aid would be an adequate substitute for the more expensive 'hard power' of defense spending, which was being cut. Thus the intention was to keep Britain globally influential, but at lower cost. Foreign aid was increasing at the same time as public services back home were being cut: this simple fact was a gift to the far right in the UK.

I was especially surprised by the chapters on the Conservative welfare policies. Here we find peak Conservative out-of-touchness. In 2004, Iain Duncan Smith resigned as party leader and founded a think tank, the Centre for Social Justice (yes, IDS is an SJW cuck), whose research identified five pathways to poverty: family breakdown, failed education, debt, addiction, and welfare dependency. The Conservatives thought that in five years they could only really tackle one of these pathways, so went with Welfare Dependency, seemingly not realising that without tackling the others, breaking the safety net would only make things worse.

(When it was obvious things were getting worse, the Government then went on to scrap to scrap the Child Poverty Act, which had imposed a legal duty on governments to reduce child poverty.)

Well-meaning incompetence is a recurring theme is this book, however the failures of government policy are downplayed. The Conservatives' heroic determination to remake British society against wide condemnation are the focus. It seems to be a mark of strength among Conservative ministers to not let people change your mind once you've committed to an ideological agenda. You stick to the plan and face down opponents, persevere through any troubles and doubts, because in the end you'll be proved right. (I was reminded of J.G. Ballard's description of Margaret Thatcher as a 'public-spirited psychopath'.) The confidence required to do this is, admittedly, quite admirable, but also TERRIFYING.

Gove is a hero for pushing ahead with his education reforms, despite teachers hating them - Gove stuck to his beliefs, kept the faith in the reform agenda, even when everything seemed terrible, even when teachers across the land were protesting against his reforms, because he knew, truly, he knew more than the teachers who had spent their lives working in education. (Gove has no experience of being a teacher: this book states that Gove was an ideal, experienced candidate for Education Secretary when he was appointed, because he had been Shadow Education Secretary in Opposition.)

The Conservative's 2010 election campaign included a promise not to carry out any unnecessary NHS reorganizations. Andrew Lansley's NHS reforms, the creation of NHS England the internal NHS Market, was the largest and most expensive NHS reorganization in history. The key word in the campaign literature was 'unnecessary' - for this was a necessary reorganization. It was pushed through early in the parliament, despite massive opposition from healthcare professionals, because Lansley believed that by the next election, marketization would improve the quality and efficiency of the service to such an extent that all the people speaking out against them now would be proved wrong and become Conservative voters. Now the NHS is in permanent crisis.

The Lib Dems do not come out of this book well (I'm tempted to read Clegg's apologetic memoir 'Between the Extremes' for comparison). During the negotiations over the Coalition agreement, William Hague was shocked by how naive the Lib Dems were, and told his wife after the meetings ended that they 'might well have destroyed the Liberal Party.' Since they were the minority in the Coalition, they obviously had less influence over policy than the Conservatives. The Lib Dems had two policies which they were determined to introduce, the two major changes that would change Britain forever and have them remembered as reformers in the grand tradition of Earl Grey and William Gladstone: electoral reform and House of Lords reform.

The former was watered down from proportional representation to the Alternative Vote referendum, which Clegg himself described as a 'miserable little compromise'. A Labour-Conservative alliance fought the No campaign, which argued on two fronts: that electoral reform would cost money better spent on the NHS and public services, especially in this period of austerity, and that Nick Clegg was a twat (an interesting revelation from the book was that George Osborne offered to pass on the tuition fee increase, because it wasn't an essential reform, but Clegg declined, saying that the appearance of a unified government in this difficult time was more important - after the meeting Osborne told his staff that the Lib Dems were 'mad to let us do this'). An informal part of the Coalition agreement was a link between the Lib Dems House of Lords reform and the Conservative's Boundary Review. When Clegg started agitating about his reform, the Conservatives decided that losing their Boundary Review until the next parliament was a worthwhile sacrifice, and so the two policies which were the raison d'etre for the Lib Dems forming the Coalition, came to nothing.

This is pro-Tory book, so it obviously glosses over other things the Lib Dems did in Parliament. Their main success in parliament was the increase in the tax-free allowance, which the Conservatives ended up taking a lot of the credit for.

As I said before, this book has levelled up my political understanding, and washed away the vestiges of my more juvenile view of the Conservative's as villains. Many are well-meaning. Doubtless many are power hungry more than well-meaning (Boris Johnson). But they are a group of people horrendously isolated from the effects of their policies, many of whom have no real world experience of what they are suddenly in charge of, and are so ideologically committed to an agenda they ignore people who know better than they (Brexit foreshadowing is fucking everywhere). And crucially, they are wrong about a lot (IMHO).

Reading about the Coalition years in detail was an odd experience: these events were in the background to my university and early graduate life, but I was barely cognizant of them. The nostalgia for the Cameron years which somewhat motivated me to read this book was more of a nostalgia for my younger, ignorant and naive self, when I was cheerfully in the uni bubble. You cannot go back to blissful ignorance: there is no return to Eden after eating the Tree of Knowledge. Not that I would actually want to go back to that: I cringe thinking of my ignorance about so many subjects back then, especially politics. As much as cringe is an uncomfortable sensation, I appreciate it shows personal development and growth. Hopefully, in a few years, when my political understanding levels up again, I will cringe while thinking back to my ignorance of today.