'I wanted to write one more book - and I wanted it to be about the future.'
'Statecraft' (2002) is Margaret Thatcher's third and final book. It contains her analysis of international trends and advice for politicians who'll have to deal with them: her 'Strategies for a Changing World.' I have no doubt this book was influential on many young policy wonks and politicos, especially those who wanted to build on Thatcher's legacy.
The book rarely mentions domestic British politics: Thatcher had once called New Labour her 'greatest achievement', because she had forced the opposition to concede defeat and embrace many of her policies. Her main criticism of New Labour, apart from its pro-EU stances, is that they spend too much: 'it is the duty of conservatives everywhere to argue for low spending'.
In 'Newswipe', Charlie Brooker compared watching the news to 'episode 389 of the world's most complex soap opera': events and characters are presented without their historical context, crises are reported on when they explode, not during their sometimes decades-long build up, making them seem random, chaotic, and unpredictable. I remember a joke (but not where it's from) about how every time the news reports on crises in the Middle East, to provide appropriate context the report should go back to at least the fall of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, if not all the way back to the Crusades.
If America wasn't the global superpower, if it was country with only minor global weight, we might have heard very little about the Trump presidency until the storming of the Capitol - this may have made the event seem random, out-of-nowhere. As it is, Trump's America has been regularly reported on for the last four years, and we have seen the steady build up leading to last week's event. It was not random; many people predicted something like this happening.
The first half of 'Statecraft' is part analysis of trends in different world regions, and partly Thatcher sharing experiences from trips abroad, complete with holiday photos. One photo is captioned: 'Walkabout with Boris Nemtsov through the centre of Nizhny Novgorod.' Her analyses contain premonitions of things which came to pass. None of it is startlingly prophetic, but it shows how our current crises were visible on the horizon decades ago, to those paying attention to foreign affairs.
She warns of 'potentially serious disputes' between Russia and Ukraine, 'especially as regards the fate of the Black Sea fleet and the future of Crimea', and between the more anti-Russian West Ukraine and the more pro-Russian East Ukraine. Russia annexed Crimea in 2014; since then, the Ukrainian Civil War, between the Ukrainian nationalists of the West and the Russia-backed separatists of the East, is ongoing.
In an entertaining chapter on her visits to China, she comes across as someone fucking sick of CCP bullshit:
'He tried to argue that democracy had failed in the West, because it had not sufficiently advanced the role of women. I looked hard at him and he moved nervously onto other ground.'
She warns that the CCP is acting really sus around the Uighur population - they may get up to some dodgy stuff and 'will undoubtedly try to justify their repression as an aspect of the war against terrorism. We should not fall for this ploy.'
Thatcher was Prime Minister during the first Iraq War, and in her memoirs directly compares Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to Hitler's earliest expansionist experiments, which were tolerated by Western leaders hoping to avoid war. She feared that if Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait wasn't met with an appropriately punishing response, he'd be encouraged to make further invasions, potentially throwing the whole region into war. In his memoirs, Blair shares this view: he, too, does not want to be remembered as a 21st century Chamberlain who failed to stop Iraq's Hitler. So it is no surprise that in 'Statecraft' Thatcher says, 'There will be no peace and security in the region until Saddam Hussein is toppled.'
Regarding Syria, she notes that it 'has a very unpleasant regime, even if that unpleasantness is directed more against Muslims than against Westerners'. President Assad and the Syrian elites are part of a religious minority (11% of the population) violently keeping the political ambitions of the larger religious groups suppressed. Which might, you know, make them more tempted by extremism.
Her segment on the 'Challenges of Islam' is rather nuanced, making clear that it is foolish to see Islam as monolithic, or inherently evil, or that religious terrorism is uniquely Islamic: the Hindu Tamil Tigers invented suicide bombing; she had herself survived assassination attempts by Irish Republican (Catholic) terrorists.
'As a conservative, and indeed as a Christian, I can appreciate much of what I come across when I visit Muslim countries and read of the opinions of sophisticated Muslim writers.'
She acknowledges that religion has 'often played a role in providing a twisted justification for terrorism', but counters that religion is but one of a panoply of factors - social, personal, economic, political - that can intertwine to convince people to commit terrorism. Here, she was almost writing an anticipatory rebuttal to the post-9/11 New Atheist arguments put forward by the likes of Sam Harris in 'The End of Faith' (2004) and Christopher Hitchens in 'God Is Not Great' (2007).
Regarding Saudi Arabia, the beating heart of radical Islam that pumps funding to extremist groups around the world, she is candid:
'We should not shy away from the blunt facts of national self interest. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are the West's most important allies in a region which is itself the principle source of the world's oil. Any power or influence which seeks the overthrow of our allies there poses a direct threat to us.'
The second half of the book is more theoretical, and I expect has been more influential, containing chapters on Human Rights, Europe, and Capitalism.
Her Europe essays contain most of the pro-Brexit arguments we are now very familiar with, from the complaint about the EU stealing our fish to the classically hyperbolic 'EU is like Nazis':
'The Nazis spoke in terms that may strike us as eerily reminiscent of today's Euro-federalists... there is nothing necessarily benevolent about programmes of European integration... European unity has been tried before, and the outcome was far from happy.'
Britain, she argues, for reasons of history and culture, is different to continental Europe. She agrees with Charles de Gaulle, who blocked Britain's first attempted entry into the European Community:
'England is insular, maritime, linked through its trade to very diverse and often very distant countries. It has marked and original customs and traditions. The nature, structure and economic context of England differ profoundly from those of the other states of the continent.'
I do think there is some merit to this point; for years the UK has been a troublesome member of the EU. Our island history has meant that while we have been heavily influenced by the continent, and there has been considerable migration between island and mainland (our Royal Family is German), Britain has for centuries been an island on the edge of Europe, not experiencing the invasions and admixture on anything like the same scale as the continental nations, which have changed shape and invaded each other countless times over the past 1000 years, while England has not been invaded since 1066 (unless you count the Glorious Revolution). 'With Europe, but not of it', as Churchill said.
Winston Churchill is often claimed by both Remainers and Leavers as one of them: he waxed lyrical about a United Europe, but was a proud British patriot who stood up for Britain against tyranny. Thatcher explains that in post-war Britain, the political class, including Churchill, was largely in favour of continental Europe uniting, but believed that Britain should remain apart. In addition to its European allies and neighbours, Britain had its close ties with America and the Commonwealth to build on. Thus, Churchill can be imagined as pro-Brexit Europhile.
But as the post-war years progressed, the Empire crumbled, the Commonwealth lost importance, and the Suez crisis showed that America was not as reliable an ally as had been thought. Britain was declining internationally, and the seemingly dynamic and fast-growing European community appeared attractive.
Politically, Britain is more rightwing than most of continental Europe. One of our top allies during the Brexit crisis has been proto-fascist Hungary. Britain lost influence in the EU under Cameron partly because he moved Conservative MEPs from the centre-right European People's Party (EPP) to the far smaller, further right European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), a move that disappointed Angela Merkel among others. Thatcher notes that in Europe there tends to be 'more generous social benefits than anyone in Britain, apart from those on the left of the Labour party, would normally consider appropriate to a 'safety net' and fears that the EU will 'seek to combat the 'neo-liberalism', i.e. the belief in free markets, which the French and German Finance Ministers so roundly denounced.'
Britain also has a different idea about human rights to the continent. The British tradition, via Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights 1689, is focused on 'negative' rights: the right NOT to have your property taken by the king, the right NOT to be imprisoned without trial. In contrast, the continental European view of rights, represented by the European Convention on Human Rights, is positive: 'the right to working conditions which respect his or her health, safety, and dignity.'
Thatcher is deeply unhappy that such un-British rights have been incorporated into British law via the Human Rights Act, which should be abolished and replaced with a proper British Bill of Rights in the proper British tradition of rights which protect the wealthy from interference from the state but do nothing to protect ordinary people from being treated like dirt by their employers.
There is more than a little paranoia in her Europe essays. This comes in part from a lack of imagination and empathy. She can't put herself into the mind of someone pushing for 'positive' rights because they think they're a good thing, she imagines some sinister European plot against Britain's economy: 'Under the cover of enforcement of 'social rights' the competitive advantage of Britain's freer markets, looser state controls and lower government spending is lost... they represent an unwelcome influence in Britain's affairs, and underlying purpose is obvious - it is to reduce Britain's ability to compete successfully.'
Her paranoia crops up elsewhere throughout the book. Sinister forces such as human rights lawyers, the EU, and environmentalists are secretly trying to destroy capitalism: 'Socialism, albeit concealed and repackaged under a variety of exteriors, is a far greater danger to freedom and prosperity than many people realise.' She is skeptical about Global Warming, which she acknowledges is happening but doesn't think it's as severe as the 'doomsters' make out: 'the usual suspects on the left have been exaggerating dangers and simplifying solutions in order to press the agenda of anti-capitalism.' It is worth mentioning that Nigel Lawson, former chancellor under Thatcher, fully committed to climate change denial and wrote a whole book about it.
I will skip over the pro-Brexit arguments that I have more sympathy with: the EU's democratic deficit, the conflict between national and supra-national interests, the dangers of monetary union, the effect of the Common Agricultural Policy and Customs Union on food prices and farmers in developing countries. I should also clarify that while she thinks Britain is very different to the continent, she also thinks the continental nations are also so different to each other that the EU wouldn't work with just them.
Crucially, and indeed heavily foreshadowing the last few years, while Thatcher devotes a lot of pages to flaws in the EU, she doesn't spend very much time detailing either what Britain should have done instead of joining the European Community, or what should be done if we leave. A few options are floated: 'a policy of unilateral free trade' which she notes might be 'politically unrealistic' but 'worth discussing... because it exposes the fallacy that outside the EU Britain would be 'alone', 'isolated', 'excluded', and so on.'
Or maybe Britain could join NAFTA (renamed North Atlantic Free Trade Area) and focus on building its relations to the US, Canada, and Mexico.
Her most speculative proposal is that Britain, with the US and other countries, could create a new global Free Trade Area.
'Ideally, of course, this would take place before Britain formally withdrew as a full member of the EU: no one wants more disruption than necessary.'
Thankfully for us, Thatcher provides sage advice for how her successors could diplomatically negotiate Britain's exit from the EU on favorable terms:
'The blunt truth is that the rest of the European Union needs us more than we need them... they know perfectly well that Britain as a European power is in a league of her own... it should be made clear right at the start that in order to secure our objectives we would be prepared, if it became necessary, to unilaterally withdraw from EU membership. This might seem at first like a provocative tactic: but it actually makes good sense.'
No deal is better than a bad deal.
I find Margaret Thatcher a fascinating character, like a real life Mrs Coulter. Her viewpoint is well argued and understandable, but there is so much missing from her analyses, however intelligent and witty they may be. Her limited life experiences and lack of imagination (as can be seen in her memoirs) leave her making some glaring errors.
Redistributive taxation is unjust because it limits the freedom of the talented wealthy to make the most out of their hard-earned wealth. She quotes her mentor, Keith Joseph, who wrote an anti-equality book: 'There is no greater tyranny possible than denying to individuals the disposal of their own talents.' Out of context, this sounds very similar to the line by Stephen Jay Gould: “I am, somehow, less interested in the weight and convolutions of Einstein’s brain than in the near certainty that people of equal talent have lived and died in cotton fields and sweatshops.” However, Joseph is complaining that rich people's talents are mildly inconvenienced by having some of their wealth taxed, while Gould is pointing out that poor people are thoroughly denied 'the disposal of their own talents'. People who have not experienced financial difficulty, who only know poverty at theoretical distance, do not understand the limits financial insecurity places on freedom.
To be fair, she acknowledges this to an extent. 'It is right that in a developed country, where such things can be afforded, that a good basic education should be provided and proper medical care made available irrespective of families ability to pay for them... and a safety net of benefits for those who genuinely cannot cope.' Taxation and public services are a necessary evil which, so as not to threaten economic freedom, should be limited as much as possible. If those at the bottom want a better life, they need to work for it, not expect the state to help them out by inconveniencing other people with higher taxes.
'As long as all men and women are truly equal before the law, and as long as the law is effectively administered and honestly adjudicated, then however much their fortunes differ they have no right to complain that they are 'unjustly' treated. It is up to them what they do with their lives and their property. They bear the ultimate responsibility for success or failure.'
Those 'as long as' conditionals are doing an awful lot of work.
